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 Many cite improved seed technologies as vital to addressing 
the challenge of food insecurity, especially when faced with 
combined stresses of global climate change, population growth, 
and natural resource depletion (Anthony and Ferroni 2012; Lipton 
2007). As improved seeds find their way into the developing world, 
policymakers are struggling to find the appropriate institutional 
mechanisms to regulate their creation and use. Arguments over 
intellectual property rights (IPR) are central to this debate. Some 
activists in the Global South are distrustful of any IPR regime that 
creates private ownership over seeds, whereas international 
financial institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
encourage stronger IPR protections for commercial seed 
breeders creating new plant varieties. Policymakers face two 
conflicting imperatives in making these policies: (1) promote 
improved seed development and distribution in ways that will 
encourage new seed innovations and protect the interests of 
commercial breeders and (2) protect the interests of farmers who 
serve as both a source of vital germplasm and as the potential 
users of these improved seeds. In this policy brief, we consider 
the sources of these conflicting imperatives for developing nations 
to protect the rights of commercial plant breeders and small 
farmers, as well as some examples of national policies trying to 
balance those demands. 
 
Competing Pressures on Institutional Designs for 
Improved Seed   
 Developing nations face two conflicting visions of property 
rights related to new genetic material in the international 
agreements related to the development and distribution of 
improved seed. On the one hand, a more traditional view of 
private ownership undergirds the IPR system required by the 
WTO through its Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement designed to promote the ownership 
rights of those creating new hybrid or transgenic seeds. On the 
other hand, an alternative and more collective view of ownership 
underlies the requirements to protect the interests of farmers who 
nurture and maintain traditional seeds that provide germplasm for 
improved hybrid and transgenic seeds, as codified in another 
international treaty, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 
Each international agreement is critical to understanding the often 
conflicting impulses that are found in the efforts of many 
developing nations to regulate the development and use of 
improved seeds. 
 
1. Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) 
 Article 27(3) b of the TRIPS agreement requires all WTO*   Authors are listed in alphabetical order. 
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members to adopt a stronger IPR system for 
protecting new plant varieties developed by plant 
breeders. The agreement requires either the ability 
to legally patent new plant varieties, or the creation 
of a sui generis “plant variety protection” (PVP) law 
that protects breeder’s rights. Developed countries 
such as the US and Japan use patent systems for 
protecting new plant varieties, but most developing 
countries have created sui generis PVP rules 
following the Union for Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants (UPOV) conventions (UPOV 1978 or 
UPOV 1991). Thus, the TRIPS agreement has led 
to approaches to protecting breeders’ IPR ranging 
from the strongest property rights under the patent 
system to weaker property rights under the UPOV 
principles, especially the 1978 agreement. 
According to supporters of the TRIPS approach, 
following classic economic theory, stronger 
intellectual property rights over new plant varieties 
for breeders should speed innovation and diffusion 
of new improved seed varieties. In practice, 
however, the TRIPS rules appear to have had mixed 
results in promoting innovation and in enabling 
transfer of new seed technologies (Tripp, Louwaars, 
and Eaton 2007; Kolady, Spielman, and Cavalieri 
2012), and may be exacerbating wealth inequalities 
between the Global North and the Global South 
(Laxman and Ansari 2012; Srinivasan 2003).   
 
Convention on Biological Diversity 
 In contrast to the TRIPS agreement, the CBD is 
a 1993 international agreement that aims for 
“conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use 
of its components and the fair and equitable sharing 
of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic 
resources, including by appropriate access to 
genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of 
relevant technologies....” In this respect, the CBD 
balances the rights of breeders with a requirement 
to ensure equitable benefit sharing with farmers, 
including mutually agreeable terms and prior 
informed consent for use of local seed lines or 
germplasm in developing improved seeds. Thus, 
the CBD argues for the recognition of farmers’ 
rights, insisting that farmers be rewarded and 
compensated for their traditional knowledge that 
may have contributed to the development of new 
commercial plant varieties.  Consistent with this 
emphasis on benefit sharing and farmers’ rights, the 
CBD promulgates a more collective form of 
ownership than TRIPS, conceiving of landraces and 
indigenous seed lines as genetic resources that are 
shared assets for the local communities that 
develop and nurture them. This approach 
recognizes that unlike commercial seed 
development, indigenous plant varieties are often 
created and maintained through informal and 
collective knowledge generation, making it difficult 
to attribute traditional property rights for a local 
germplasm or seed variety to a particular person or 
entity (Brush 2007).  
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3. Different Provisions for Balancing Farmer 
and Breeder Rights 
 Governments confront a number of specific 
issues in trying to balance the protection of 
breeders’ rights required by TRIPS and the 
protection of farmers’ rights mandated by the CBD.  
We briefly review some of those key provisions 
here. 
 
Protecting Collective and Informal Farming 
Practices in PVP Legislation  
 Countries vary in how their PVP policies provide 
farmers’ exemptions to breeders’ rights. Under 
UPOV 1978, protected new plant varieties can be 
used by other breeders (including farmers) for 
creating additional varieties. The 1991 UPOV 
strengthened breeders' rights, however, by granting 
rights over Essentially Derived Varieties (EDVs) 
from an original seed to the original breeder. This 
provision is a potential barrier for farmers who have 
traditionally developed new varieties by breeding 
indigenous seeds with seeds protected by PVP 
laws, making the resulting “farmers’ varieties” 
potentially a violation of the 1991 UPOV rules. In 
addition, UPOV 1978 allows farmers to engage in 
collective seed exchange and seed saving even of 
protected seeds for non-commercial purposes, 
whereas UPOV 1991 does not allow seed exchange 
of protected plant varieties. Countries today follow 
both models, permitting different amounts of 
traditional seed saving and breeding practices by 
subsistence farmers.  
 
Informed Consent and Benefit Sharing 
 According to many analysts, commercial 
breeders and small farmers can both benefit from 
the sharing of genetic resources: small farmers in 
developing countries can gain access to modern 
seed varieties with improved traits while commercial 
breeders and plant scientists often need genetic 
material from traditional varieties to develop 
improved seeds (von der Osten 2005). The terms of 
this sharing of genetic resources is a complex part 
of any IPR policy for improved seeds. The CBD 
recommends that developing countries should 
share indigenous genetic resources and import 
improved seeds or other genetically modified 
organisms based on the principle of “informed 
consent” and with significant “benefit sharing” for the 
communities who provided the original germplasm 
for any newly commercialized seed line.  
 Countries take different approaches to these 
mandates. Consistent with the CBD, many nations 
require some form of “informed consent” by local 
communities for any private or commercial use of 
local seed lines or germplasm, although the 
mechanisms for obtaining that consent vary 
significantly. In some cases, countries also require 
compensation or “benefit sharing” with farmers or 
indigenous communities for any use of local plant 
lines or germplasm, raising complex issues of how 
to organize this transfer of wealth from commercial 
breeders to local farmers. Depending on the 
approach, some national legislation on benefit 
sharing may risk violating the TRIPS requirements 
to protect the rights of commercial breeders 
(Laxman and Ansari 2012). Benefit sharing 
arrangements are also beset by practical challenges 
such as the difficulty of assigning ownership or 
credit for a particular “trait” or indigenous seed line 
within various farming communities, or the 
difficulties in creating contracts between private 
sector and farming communities (Plahe 2011). In 
addition, indigenous communities are often 
vulnerable when negotiating over benefit sharing 
due to their lack of political power and awareness of 
the specifics of PVP rules, or their cultural rejection 
of the private property assumptions behind such an 
arrangement (DaVia 2012; Srinivasan 2003).  
  
Protecting Farmer’s Seed Varieties 
 Finally, some nations use PVP laws to allow 
farmers to protect their local varieties with their own 
unique property rights, going beyond the “benefit 
sharing” paradigm. Such policies allow farmers or 
communities to legally register their distinct varieties 
as intellectual property. At the same time, these 
rules can require that varieties demonstrate 
“novelty, distinctiveness, uniformity, and stability” 
(NDUS) in order to receive formal recognition and 
protection. While these standards are desirable for 
commercial seed breeders, many farmers prefer 
variation in their varieties in order to maintain 




against crop failures—preferences that make it 
difficult to get their varieties protected unless 
exceptions are made for farmers’ varieties in this 
regard (DaVia 2012; Salazar et al. 2007).  
 
4. Case Study: India’s Attempt to Balance 
Breeders’ and Farmers’ Rights.   
 In this section we describe how a leading nation, 
India, has balanced the conflicting obligations to 
breeders and farmers as represented by TRIPS and 
the CBD in its laws related to the development and 
use of improved seed. The so-called “Indian model” 
is often cited as an example for other nations 
considering these opposing tensions in PVP laws, 
especially other nations in South Asia. India also 
offers several original ideas for protecting both 
farmers’ and breeders’ rights, making it a useful 
source of ideas for balancing the TRIPS and CBD 
imperatives. The nation generally follows the UPOV 
1978 model in developing its sui generis PVP 
system, but seeks a complex balance between 
breeders’ rights and farmers’ rights as described 
below: 
 
Protecting Collective and Informal Farming 
Practices  
 India’s Protection of Plant Varieties and 
Farmers’ Rights Act (PPVFRA) of 2001 protects 
farmers’ rights to save, sow, resow, exchange, 
share, use or sell seeds or the produce from seeds, 
including even protected varieties of seed registered 
under the law.  The only limit on this right is that 
farmers are not allowed to sell such seeds as 
“branded” seeds, meaning they cannot label them 
as being of a variety protected under the law. Thus, 
India formally allows farmers to engage in 
commercial use and even sale of protected seeds 
as long as it is not under a breeder’s brand name. 
Although the Indian law gives commercial breeders 
the right to register essentially derived varieties 
(EDVs) from a protected seed, this requires a 
separate application process for those varieties and 
remains subject to the strong farmers’ exemptions 
to those commercial rights. In short, India includes 
very strong protections of farmers’ informal 
practices in its PVP regulations, even while allowing 
for commercial protection of new improved seed 
varieties by different commercial breeders. 
 
Informed Consent and Benefit Sharing  
 Although India may seem to be very strong on 
farmers’ rights in terms of protecting traditional uses 
and even commercial trade by farmers in protected 
seeds, the country’s rules are less favorable to 
farmers in terms of prior informed consent and 
benefit sharing for the use of local land races or 
germplasm. The Biological Diversity Act (BDA) of 
2002, enacted to meet the CBD mandate, does 
require anyone seeking to use a “biological 
resource” or “knowledge associated thereto” for 
research or commercial development to get 
permission from the National Biodiversity Authority. 
In this respect, India’s approach to informed consent 
is more focused on the national government than on 
local communities, especially compared to other 
proposed laws in South Asia related to 
implementing these CBD provisions as discussed 
below. 
 In terms of benefit sharing, the Biological 
Diversity Act requires the National Biodiversity 
Authority to ensure the “equitable sharing of 
benefits” from any approved access to biological 
resources. The law provides a range of options for 
providing such benefit sharing, including joint 
ownership of the resulting IPR with the National 
Biodiversity Authority or another “benefit claimer” 
such as local farmers, the location of new economic 
development stemming from the new seed 
technology, or direct monetary compensation to 
those seeking benefits as the National Biodiversity 
Authority determines appropriate.  The law also 
creates a National Biodiversity Fund, where 
payments for benefit sharing may be deposited 
before being allocated to the appropriate groups or 
used for “conservation and promotion of biological 
resources” in general.  
 Even India’s PVP law incorporates similar 
provisions for benefit sharing for groups who have 
contributed “genetic material” used to create a new 
plant variety being protected. In this instance, 
however, the burden is on the local farmers or other 
claimants to seek benefit sharing by filing a claim 
when a new commercial seed variety is registered. 
Any required benefit sharing is to be paid to the 
government’s National Gene Fund, to be used 
either for direct payments to claimants, or for 
“supporting the conservation and sustainable use of 
genetic resources” in the field and in seed banks, as 
well as other programs related to “breeding, 
discovery or development of varieties” of seeds.   
 In both laws, therefore, benefit sharing is 
structured more as a negotiation of claims 
adjudicated by the government agency rather than 
a right of local communities. The PVP law puts the 
burden on local communities or other sources of 




when a new variety is registered, rather than on the 
commercial firms doing the registration. While the 
legislation requires authorities to advertise the 
registration of new varieties, it may be difficult for 
indigenous groups or subsistence farmers to keep 
track of such registrations and file claims within that 
period.  In sum, both the Biodiversity and PVP laws 
offer a weaker version of benefit sharing for farmers 
who contribute local germplasm to a new 
commercial seed variety compared to the very 
strong protections offered for traditional farmer uses 
of seeds, including improved seeds. 
 
Protecting Farmers’ Seed Varieties 
 In contrast to its benefit sharing approach, India 
provides fairly ambitious opportunities for farmers to 
protect their local seed varieties with formal property 
rights. The PVP legislation encourages farmers to 
register their own “farmers’ varieties” of seeds with 
the government, giving them a similar level of 
protection to the registered seeds of commercial 
seed breeders. Thus, India’s PVP law includes an 
ambitious attempt to allow farmers to secure their 
own IPR for their locally-created seed varieties, 
even as it incorporates relatively weaker provisions 
for other forms of benefit sharing for giving farmers 
other compensation for the use of their local seed 
lines in the creation of new commercial seeds. 
 
5. Implications of the Indian Model 
 As noted, India was the first nation in South Asia 
to enact formal laws to address both the TRIPS and 
CBD mandates to protect breeders’ and farmers’ 
rights. Other nations in the region have debated 
similar proposals with different degrees of emphasis 
on farmers’ or breeders’ rights. Bangladesh, for 
instance, has debated a biodiversity act that is even 
more protective of farmers’ rights, including a 
benefit sharing provision that requires that at least 
50% of the “net monetary gain” from any 
commercial use of a biological or genetic resource 
goes to the relevant local community. Sri Lanka, 
meanwhile, remains in major conflict over balancing 
breeders’ and farmers’ rights as represented by a 
2013 draft seed law that proposes more stringent 
limitations on farmers’ uses of protected seed 
varieties. Thus, other nations continue to struggle 
with how to balance these two imperatives, in some 
cases looking at India as an example. 
 At the same time, implementation of the Indian 
rules is complex, and has led to mixed results. 
Although some research argues that the PPVFRA 
has helped increase private seed innovation and 
higher yields for several crops (Kolady et al. 2012), 
others are less sanguine about the effects of the 
new law. Many farmers in India are mistrustful of 
any IPR protections for seeds, seeing those 
property rights as foreign to their culture and 
imposed by external actors like the WTO. This 
means farmers are often reluctant to register their 
seed varieties as permitted under the Indian PVP 
law. In addition, the bureaucratic complexities of 
both seed registration and applications for benefit 
sharing make these “farmers’ rights” difficult for 
many rural farmers to negotiate or access (Plahe 
2011; Ramprasad and Clements 2016). 
Registrations of farmers’ varieties have increased 
significantly in the past two years: as of March 2015, 
539 farmers’ varieties had been registered for IPR 
protection under the Indian law (Bhutani 2015). 
Most of those registrations happen, however, only 
because of the work of “intermediaries”— 
individuals and groups who encourage farmers to 
register their varieties and help them negotiate the 
significantly complex process to do so (Bhutani 
2015; Ramprasad and Clements 2016). What 
benefits will accrue to farmers from registering these 
protected varieties, however, remains unclear. In 
addition, it is evident that the actual system of seed 
production and distribution proceeds in India, as in 
other nations, according to a wide range of informal 
rules that are often inconsistent with the formal rules 
of the PPVFRA or the BDA, and that informal 
networks of seed distribution do not strictly adhere 
to the rules of the formal seed IPR system (c.f. 
Herring 2007). Thus, changes in formal PVP rules 
may have limited or surprising effects on some long-
standing practices for seed distribution and use. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 Those promoting improved seed technologies 
as a mechanism for increasing food security and 
access to nutrition face an important set of tensions 
regarding the appropriate property rights 
arrangements for such technologies. Current 
international institutions offer important and 
apparently conflicting requirements for national 
policies to balance the rights of commercial 
breeders and local farmers. There is passionate 
disagreement about the best way to balance these 
rights, with some arguing for the better incorporation 
of benefit sharing and informed consent provisions 
in TRIPS based PVP laws stressing improved 
property rights for even farmers’ seed varieties, and 
others rejecting an IPR-based approach to this 




farmers and promote food security without relying 
on stronger property rights. Meanwhile, developing 
nations continue to struggle to identify policies that 
can meet the conflicting international mandates for 
farmers’ and breeders’ rights. Any future progress 
on the equitable use of improved seeds to address 
food security issues will require creative thinking 
about the role of IPR in such a system, as well as a 
recognition of the problematic relationship between 
formal PVP and “access and benefit sharing” rules 
as enacted and their actual implementation, as the 
Indian experience has shown. 
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